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INFORMING WORKERS OF THE RIGHT TO WORKPLACE 
REPRESENTATION: REASONABLY MOVING FROM THE 
MIDDLE OF THE HIGHWAY TO THE INFORMATION 
SUPERHIGHWAY 
G. MICAH WISSINGER* 
INTRODUCTION 
An oft forgotten and disregarded fundamental promise to 
American workers is the right to self-representation in the workplace 
conferred by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” 
or “the Act”).1  Section 7 gives employees “the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations. . . .”2  This 
right has been forgotten in large part because, while belonging to the 
employee, it can only gain effect through the accommodation of an 
agent on employer property, the union organizer.3  Through various 
agency decisions and court holdings, the basic section 7 right of an 
employee to receive information about workplace representation has 
been narrowed4 to the point of relegating unions to unreasonable and 
ineffective methods of communication. 
The requirements of the Act inject a measure of rivalry into the 
choice for workplace representation by requiring a secret ballot 
 
         *  J.D. Northeastern University School of Law, 2002; B.A. Oklahoma City University, 
1999.  The author is a Legal Fellow with the Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO 
in Washington, DC.  He wishes to thank Professor Ira Sills for his inspiration, Professor Karl 
Klare for his commitment to teaching and helpful suggestions for this article, and Professor Kim 
Dulin for her valuable assistance.  The author also wishes to thank his family, Ms. Elizabeth 
Gazay, and Mr. Asan Askin for continued encouragement and support.   
 1. Id. §§ 151–169 (1998). 
  2. See id. § 157.  The Act defines a “labor organization” to be “any organization of any 
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees 
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions 
of work.”  29 U.S.C. § 152(5). 
 3. Cynthia Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty after Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
305, 325–27 (1994); Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Labor Law Access Rules and Stare 
Decisis: Developing A Planned Parenthood-Based Model of Reform, 20 BERKLEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 138, 143–44 (1999). 
 4.  Estlund, supra note 3, at 311–21. 
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election when a question concerning representation cannot be 
resolved between the parties.5  However, the contentious nature of 
representation elections has become more  pronounced in the dis-
semination of pre-election campaign information, resulting in a 
competition between employers and unions rather than an exercise in 
accommodation.6  One way that the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB” or “the Board”) and reviewing courts have furthered the 
pre-election contest rivalry for information is by awarding remedies 
to unions as a way to “balance” the gross inadequacies of access to 
workers.  The Board seems to forget, however, that section 7 gives 
rights to workers and not to unions or employers.  A “remedy” to the 
imbalance of access was announced in Excelsior Underwear Inc.,7 
which requires that the names and addresses of workers be given to 
unions so that they can visit workers at their homes instead of on 
employer property.8 
Arguments for reforming the rules of access, specifically the doc-
trine laid out in Excelsior, are far from novel.9  One way to achieve 
 
 5. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1).  A question concerning representation exists when a labor 
organization or individual seeks recognition as a bargaining agent and the employer refuses to 
grant recognition; the statute does not require the parties to use the formal processes of the 
NLRB.  However, section 9 provides a framework for formal election procedure.  1 THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS ACT 376 (Patrick Harding et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAW]. 
 6. Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and 
Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 497 (1993).  Becker outlines the origins of the 
contest theory of the representation election in the context of free speech rights.  Id. at 547–61.  
He concludes, “the right to [workplace] representation has been subverted by lawmakers’ 
interpretation of industrial democracy in terms of an analogy between political and union 
elections—an analogy that suggests a theory of the union election as a contest between union 
and employer.”  Id. at 602. 
 7. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1245 (1966) (citing prior Board decisions regarding access as 
determinative).  Excelsior also cites  the “employer’s interest in controlling property” as 
significant.  Id. at 1245. 
 8. Id. at 1241 (stating that “access of all employees . . . can be insured only if all parties 
have the names and addresses of all the voters.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Leonard Bierman, Extending Excelsior, 69 IND. L.J. 521, 524–25 (1994) 
[hereinafter Bierman, Reply] (replying to White’s article); Leonard Bierman, Toward a New 
Model For Union Organizing: The Home Visits Doctrine and Beyond, 27 B.C. L. REV. 1, 28–30 
(1985) [hereinafter Bierman, Home Visits] (setting forth the home visits doctrine and arguing it 
is an ineffectual trade-off in access to workers); Gely & Bierman, supra note 3, at 180–81 
(proposing reform in labor law access rules); David Greenhaus, Should the NLRB Revisit 
Excelsior?, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 259, 273–77 (1998) (arguing for reform of private 
sector Excelsior doctrine in light of the contrary rule applied to public sector employees through 
the Privacy Act); Martin H. Malin, Labor Law Reform: Waiting for Congress, 69 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 277, 281 (1994) (suggesting that adjudicatory rulemaking should reshape Excelsior); 
Randall J. White, Union Representation Election Reform: Equal Access and the Excelsior Rule, 
67 IND. L. J. 129, 160–66 (1991) (proposing an extensive overhaul of the Excelsior doctrine). 
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meaningful communication with employees is to insert a neutral party 
into the competition for representation election access.  That neutral 
party would be technology. 
There has been a substantial amount of recent scholarship sug-
gesting methods for the incorporation of technology into representa-
tion elections.10  Most articles regarding the incorporation of e-mail 
and the Internet have revolved around employer rights in their 
corporate e-mail systems vis á vis the doctrines of workplace and 
work time solicitation and distribution.11  Scarce, if any, comment has 
been made about incorporating technology into the reform of non-
work time organizing options and the  Excelsior doctrine itself, this 
Note sets forth such a proposal. 
This Note primarily focuses on a reform of Excelsior using pri-
vate e-mail accounts and Internet web sites.  It is premised on the 
previously articulated presumption that the Excelsior doctrine serves 
as an incomplete remedy to the rules for union access to workers, and 
also on the idea that an extensive overhaul of the doctrine of repre-
sentation elections is preferable to any partial reform.12 
Section I of this Note provides background on the rules of access, 
specifically Excelsior, its informational aim, and the “home visits 
doctrine.”  Section II sets forth the argument for reform and provides 
a proposal for using private e-mail and Internet web sites as modes of 
communication in the representation election.  Section III provides a 
case example that highlights the need for reform and shows the utility 
of technology as the communication means in representation elec-
tions. 
 
 10. See Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in 
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Susan S. 
Robfogel, Electronic Communication and the NLRA: Union Access and Employer Rights, 16 
LAB. L.J. 231 (2000); Gwynne A. Wilcox, Section 7 Rights of Employees and Union Access to 
Employees: Cyber Organizing, 16 LAB. L.J. 253 (2000); Elena N. Broder, Note, (Net)Workers’ 
Rights: the NLRA and Employee Electronic Communications, 105 YALE L.J. 1639 (1996). 
 11. See Fredrick D. Rapone, Jr., Comment, This Is Not Your Grandfather’s Labor Union—
Or is it? Exercising Section 7 Rights in the Cyberspace Age, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 657 (2001); Cheryl 
M. Stanton, Comment, Organizing Online: Union Solicitation on Employers’ E-Mail Systems, 
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 653 (1996). 
 12. See Gely & Bierman, supra note 3 (arguing for an extensive overhaul of the representa-
tion election and rejecting the “piecemeal” approach resulting from stare decisis). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The NLRA charges the NLRB with administering and enforcing 
most private-sector American labor policy,13 which theoretically 
fosters industrial peace and workplace harmony through collective 
bargaining.14  To this end, a process must first play out in the repre-
sentation election—a process not normally characterized as peace-
ful.15  It is often the work of the NLRB to lend dignity to 
representation elections through the enactment and enforcement of 
procedures designed to balance the interests of employees and 
employers while, at the same time, accommodating unions in their 
attempt to supply employees with the information necessary to make 
an informed decision for workplace representation.16 
A. Access Generally 
It is outside the scope of this Note to give extensive treatment to 
each of the limitations placed on workplace and work time organiz-
ing, but for ease of discussion, the rules can be broken into four 
factors.17  First, the status of the organizer as an employee or nonem-
ployee is often crucial to determining the treatment and protection 
ultimately provided by a reviewing court.18  Timing is also an impor-
tant factor because there is a general presumption to protect non-
work-time organizing.19  The third factor in determining access rights 
 
 13. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1998). 
 14. 29 U.S.C. § 151; see also Peter Levine, The Legitimacy of Labor Unions, 18 HOFSTRA 
LAB. L.J. 529, 531 (2001) (citing NLRA text and undertaking a comprehensive moral critique of 
modern labor relations). 
 15. E.g., J. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 
(1976) (examining the effects of fiercely contested representation elections).  But see Paul 
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1782 (1983) (disagreeing with Getman et al. in their methodology and 
their conclusion that the effects of illegal employer tactics do not affect the outcome of 
representation elections). 
 16. Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under 
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 53–54 (1964) (arguing for imposing 
legal constraints in elections to preserve the implicit goal of fairness). 
 17. E.g., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 5, at 87–104. 
 18. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533 (1992) (banning nonemployee union 
organizers from employer owned property is permissible); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 
U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (permitting ban on nonemployee union organizers where other methods of 
communication are available). 
 19. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (holding that employers may 
exert control over property to limit organizing from interfering with safety or production); see 
also id. at 803 n.10 (citing the Peyton Packing presumption that “work time is for work”). 
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centers on the location of the organizing activity.20  The final factor, 
which often warrants different treatment depending on the context 
established by the other three factors, is whether to characterize the 
organization actions as solicitation or distribution.21 
Section 7 says nothing of the rights of unions or employers.  
However, their respective interests in the representation election 
became a permanent part of the section 7 discourse in NLRB v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Co.22  The Babcock Court resolved a split in the 
circuits over the treatment of nonemployee union organizers distrib-
uting union literature in employer owned parking lots.23  The resulting 
decision provided for an accommodation of interests rather than an 
absolute upholding of employee section 7 rights.24  The Court stated 
that “[o]rganization rights are granted to workers by the same author-
ity, the National Government, that preserves property rights.  Ac-
commodation between the two must be obtained with as little 
destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the 
other.”25 
The Court acknowledged that the right to self-organization un-
der the Act depended, to some degree, on the “ability of employees 
 
 20. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 621 (1962) (banning solicitation and 
distribution in work areas held permissible because of litter and threats to production).  
Additional restraints are often imposed on hospital and retail workers.  Beth Israel Hosp. v. 
NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978) (needing to provide “tranquil atmosphere” as reason to prohibit 
organizing); May Dep’t Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797, 803 (1962), enforcement denied, 316 F.2d 
797 (6th Cir. 1963) (prohibiting discussion of union matters on the retail floor). 
 21. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 797–98 (dealing with solicitation); Stoddard-Quirk, 138 
N.L.R.B. at 619–20 (recognizing solicitation and distribution of literature are different 
“techniques” and holding that work areas should be free from distribution).  For a review of the 
distinctions to be drawn between solicitation and distribution see Bok, supra note 16, at 92–96. 
 22. 351 U.S. 105.  In Babcock, the Court held that employers could prevent nonemployee 
union organizers from entering their parking lots.  Id. at 113–14.  The employer’s plants were 
located near small towns and a large percentage of employees lived in these nearby towns, thus 
the Court reasoned that there were other methods of distributing information to these 
employees, and the plant owners could not be required to allow nonemployee union organizers 
to distribute literature in the parking lots.  Id. at 107–08, 113.  Employer property rights had 
already been recognized in Republic Aviation, yet not in the context of preventing nonemployee 
access.  324 N.L.R.B. 793. 
 23. 351 U.S. 105.  In three cases the Board found that employers had committed unfair 
labor practices by refusing to allow union organizers access to company parking lots.  The Fifth 
and Tenth Circuits denied enforcement of the Board’s orders and the Sixth Circuit granted 
enforcement.  Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 485 (1954), enforcement denied, 222 F.2d 
316 (5th Cir. 1955); Seamprufe, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 24 (1954), enforcement denied, 222 F.2d 858 
(10th Cir. 1955); Ranco, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 998 (1954), enforced, 222 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1955). 
 24. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112. 
 25. Id. 
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to learn the advantages of self-organization from others.”26  Thus, the 
Court created an exception stating: 
[t]he employer may not affirmatively interfere with organization; 
the union may not always insist that the employer aid organization.  
But, when the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the 
reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them 
through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property has 
been required to yield to the extent needed to permit communica-
tion of information on the right to organize.  The determination of 
the proper adjustments rests with the Board.27 
Babcock created this “reasonable means to communication” ex-
ception, but the Court held that it did not apply to the situation facing 
the Babcock union organizers.28  The Court stated that the union 
could adequately inform workers of their right to self-organization 
without entering the employers’ parking lots.29  The Court based 
much of its reasoning on the fact that most of the employees lived in 
small towns close to the plants, drove to work, and parked in    
company-owned lots.30  These lots were accessible only by driving 
down a company-owned driveway.  The Court said the organizers 
could communicate with employees at the driveway gates.31  How-
ever, the Board previously concluded that the traffic conditions at the 
driveway entrance made it “practically impossible for union organiz-
ers to distribute leaflets safely to employees in motors as they enter or 
leave the lot.”32  Despite the practical difficulties in communication, 
the Court held that there were still readily available methods of 
communication for the union to utilize, without expanding on what 
those methods were.33 
B. Excelsior 
Most of the modern rules of representation campaign access 
were in place when Professor Derek Bok offered suggestions for a 
more stable approach to this area of the law in 1964.34  A case that 
 
 26. Id. at 113. 
 27. Id. at 112. 
 28. Id. at 113. 
   29. Id. at 113. 
 30. Id. at 106–08, 113. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 107. 
 33. Id. at 113. 
 34. See Bok, supra note 16.  According to the Westlaw database, Bok’s article has been 
cited by the Supreme Court six times, by lower courts in seventy-two decisions, and quoted by 
the Board in thirty-seven decisions (as of Jan. 7, 2002). 
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grew out of the times was Excelsior Underwear Inc.,35 which marked 
an end to at least one facet of the problems cited by Bok as under-
mining the election process:36  the inability of unions to reach workers 
with section 7 information during nonwork time.37 
Excelsior required “higher standards of disclosure” by mandating 
that seven days after a representation election is set, employers must 
provide the Board with an “Excelsior list” that includes the names 
and addresses of all members of the proposed bargaining unit.38  The 
union may then request the list and the failure or refusal of an em-
ployer to supply the list is grounds for setting aside the election.39  The 
right of a union to receive an Excelsior list was upheld by the Su-
preme Court in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.40 This edict has re-
mained virtually unchanged since 1969.  Although not often 
distinguishable, two of Excelsior’s goals were to provide section 7 
information to employees and to provide balance in the contest for 
access to employees.  The informational goal can be found in the 
Excelsior decision itself.41  The balance of access theory is a result of a 
group of decisions collectively referred to as the home visits doc-
trine.42 
1. Informational Aim 
Central to the reasoning in Excelsior was the much-extolled be-
lief that an informed electorate, possessing all the relevant informa-
tion, will make the superior choice when confronted with a decision 
for workplace representation.43  The Board asserted that, among 
other factors, a lack of information impedes free choice in an elec-
tion.44  Through the new rule announced in Excelsior, the Board 
sought to “remove the impediment to communication” by helping 
 
 35. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).  In this case, the Board refers to Bok as a “thoughtful 
commentator” and cites him  for the idea of giving contact information to unions.  Id. at 1242 
n.18. 
 36. Bok suggests that the Board adopt policies that would withstand “the vicissitudes of 
changing attitudes and administrations.”  Bok, supra note 16, at 39. 
 37. Id. at 99–100. 
 38. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239–40. 
 39. Id. at 1240. 
 40. 394 U.S. 759 (1969). 
 41. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1240–41. 
 42. See infra notes 51–56 and accompanying text. 
 43. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1242. 
 44. Id. at 1240. 
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unions disseminate information during nonwork time.45  It explicitly 
recognized that an employer, through ostensible property rights, has 
an inherent advantage in communicating its views on union organiz-
ing efforts.46  As such, the need for “prompt disclosure”47 of an 
address list seemed the “obvious” remedy to the lack of access union 
organizers faced in reaching workers.48 
Implicit in Excelsior is the fact that the list is not designed to di-
rectly help unions, but to permit voting employees to make informed 
decisions.49  Cases involving Excelsior lists continue to come before 
the Board for determination.  The standard language in a case 
concerning a dispute over an Excelsior list confirms the central role of 
the list as providing information to the employee.  The language 
reads: “[t]o ensure that all eligible voters have the opportunity to be 
informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right to vote, 
all parties to the election should have access to a list of voters and 
their addresses that may be used to communicate with them.”50 
The Excelsior decision analogizes to other types of elections in 
which voter contact information is a commodity, such as political 
elections, stockholder elections, and elections for union office.51  
Some critics have challenged this analogy, particularly as it applies to 
political elections.52  However, for the purposes of this Note, the 
validity of this analogy is presumed as evidence of the intent to 
inform the worker-electorate of their section 7 right to representa-
tion. 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1239. 
 48. Id. at 1241. 
 49. Were the goal of Excelsior to help the union, the list would be made available before it 
was required to garner enough support from the electorate to be able to file for an election.  See 
Bierman, Reply, supra note 9, at 524; see also STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSBERG & JUDITH A, SCOTT, 
ORGANIZING AND THE LAW, 211 (4th ed. 1991); infra note 62. 
 50. Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1236; N.L.R.B. v. Wyman-Gordan Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). 
 51. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1242. 
 52. Becker, supra note 6, at 516–24 (examining the “common democratic vernacular,” and 
arguing that “conflation” with political elections “mask[s] the disparity of power” that 
motivated passage of the NLRA); Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation 
Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 436–55 (1995) (arguing 
against the “Bokian” conceptualization of the representation election as analogous to the 
political); Weiler, supra note 15, at 1813–15. 
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2. Home Visits Doctrine 
The same day the Board handed down Excelsior, it announced in 
General Electric Co. that it would resist making other changes to the 
procedures of representation elections until the effects of Excelsior 
became known.53  General Electric involved a challenge to the practice 
of employer “captive audience” speeches, a method of communica-
tion denied to unions.54 The holdings of Excelsior and General Elec-
tric, coupled with two 1957 cases involving a union’s right to approach 
employees in their homes during representation campaigns,55 resulted 
in what is called the “home visits doctrine.”56 
For over fifteen years, Professor Leonard Bierman has led the 
debate over the home visits doctrine, focusing on its sheer ineffec-
tiveness and concern for employee privacy rights in the home.57  
Professor Bierman suggests that the Excelsior doctrine and the 
derivative home visits doctrine operate under a “tremendous imbal-
ance in organization opportunities.”58  A union is not entitled to an 
Excelsior list until seven days after a representation election has been 
scheduled,59 yet a representation election cannot be scheduled with-
out a showing of interest of 30 percent of the employees in the unit 
petitioning for election.60  This has led to additional criticism of 
 
 53. Gen. Electric. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247, 1251 (1966).  The employer held a “captive 
audience” speech during work time and denied the union the right to be present at the meeting.  
Id.  Professor Bierman details this line of cases and states that General Electric was a test case 
attempting to overturn the precedent set forth in Livingston Shirt which denied unions the right 
to speak at an employer’s speech to employees.  Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 7.  The 
Board in General Electric avoided examining the captive speech precedent by citing to Excelsior 
as “an increased opportunity for employees’ access to communications.”  Gen. Electric., 156 
N.L.R.B. at 1251; Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 7. 
 54. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1250.  Unions have no right to reply to a captive audience speech.  
Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 409 (1953). 
 55. Plant City Welding & Tank Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 131, 133–34 (1957) (allowing unions to 
visit employee homes), overruled on other grounds by Harborside Healthcare, Inc. v. NLRB, 
230 F.3d 206 (6th Cir, 2000); Peoria Plastics Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545, 546 (1957) (finding employer 
home visits per se coercive); see also, e.g., Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 7–9 (discussing 
Peoria Plastics, Plant City Welding, Excelsior, and General Electric as the basis of the home 
visits doctrine). 
   56. Professor Bierman adopted the phrase in his article examining this line of cases.  It 
serves as a method of referring to these four cases, which when read together, imply that unions 
will visit employees in their homes to communicate section 7 information.  See Bierman, Home 
Visits, supra note 9. 
 57. Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9; Bierman, Reply, supra note 9; Gely & Bierman, 
supra note 3. 
 58. Bierman, Reply, supra note 9, at 524. 
   59. Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239–40. 
   60. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (2001) states in pertinent part that “it being the Board’s 
administrative experience that in the absence of special factors the conduct of an election serves 
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Excelsior in that it provides “too little, too late” in the way of bal-
ance.61  Professor Bierman argues that the timing of the trigger for an 
Excelsior list has “contribute[d] to the general ineffectiveness of 
union home visits as an organizational ‘balancer.’”62 
3. Prior Reform Suggestions 
In 1991, student author Randall White proposed extending Ex-
celsior by making an Excelsior list available before the critical 30 
percent prepetition showing of support is garnered for an election.63  
His proposed extension of Excelsior was aimed at balancing access for 
organizers against employer property.64  However, more than a 
decade after White’s proposal to extend Excelsior, little has changed 
except for the further entrenchment of employer property rights and 
the pushing of organizers further from the meaningful communication 
of section 7 rights.65 
In the interest of employee privacy, Professor Bierman disagrees 
with White’s extension as a matter of degree, yet he agrees with the 
proposal in chief.  He notes that reform is even more necessary due to 
further limitations placed on nonemployee access by the Supreme 
Court in Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB.66  Authors Bierman and White offer 
numerous suggestions for the reform of Excelsior and both arrive at 
the same conclusion–the current standards governing labor represen-
tation elections are not effective and are unduly biased in favor of 
employers.67 
C. Lechmere: What Remains of Nonemployee Access? 
The latest restrictions in nonemployee access to workers came 
from the Supreme Court in 1992 in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB.68  The 
case involved union organizers trying to solicit workers at a Connecti-
 
no purpose under the statute unless the petitioner has been designated by at least 30 percent of 
the employees.” 
 61. Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 9; White, supra note 9 (commenting on 
Bierman’s article at 27 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1985)); see also Bierman, Reply, supra note 9, at 524–25 
(replying to White’s article, supra note 9). 
   62. Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 9. 
 63. White, supra note 9, at 161–66. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Bierman, Reply, supra note 9, at 522. 
 66. Id. at 521–22. 
 67. Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 35; Bierman, Reply, supra note 9 at 532; White, 
supra note 9, at 167. 
 68. 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
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cut shopping center.69  They leafleted cars in a publicly accessible 
parking lot during times it was believed that employees owned most 
of the cars in the lot.70  The employer ousted the organizers from the 
public parking lot and they were forced to move their operations to a 
nearby grassy area beside busy highway traffic.71  From there they 
recorded license plates that they gave to a contact at the Connecticut 
Department of Motor Vehicles in an attempt to identify workers for 
mailings and home visits.72  The union also placed advertisements in 
local newspapers but, despite its efforts, still failed to identify 80 
percent of the employees.73 
The Board held that it was improper for the employer to exclude 
the organizers from the parking lot because there was no other 
reasonable means of communication available to inform workers of 
their section 7 rights.74  The Supreme Court reversed the Board and 
the First Circuit’s affirmation of the Board’s decision,75 holding that 
nonemployee union organizers should only be allowed access to an 
employer’s property, even a parking lot, when workers are inaccessi-
ble to the union through traditional methods of communication.76  
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, stated that, although the Board 
was given the power to accommodate section 7 rights and property 
rights, it had given too much weight to Babcock’s “other reasonable 
means of communication exception.”77  The Court held that the 
exception was intended to be extremely narrow and that the union 
must show “unique obstacles” to communication.78 
 
 69. Id. at 529. 
 70. Id. at 529–30. 
 71. Id. at 530. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  The union identified forty-one employees and obtained one signed authorization 
card. 
 74. Lechmere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 92, 94 (1988) (adopting the ALJ’s cease and desist order). 
 75. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 76. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 540. 
 77. Id. at 539–40. 
 78. Id. at 541.  Babcock stated that the exception should apply to workers whose living 
quarters place them beyond the reach of the union’s message.  NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 
Co., 351 U.S. 102, 113 (1956).  Lechmere held this to apply only to very limited situations such as 
mining camps, logging camps, and remote mountain resort hotels.  502 U.S. at 539. 
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II. REFORM PROPOSAL 
A. Lechmere and Reasonableness 
The Lechmere Court found that “[a]ccess to employees, not suc-
cess in winning them over, is the critical issue–although success, or 
lack thereof, may be relevant in determining whether reasonable 
access exists.”79  Glossed over and possibly altogether forgotten is that 
it is not the union’s success in “winning them over” with which the 
Court should be concerned, but, rather, the success of maintaining 
meaningful accommodation by protecting the right of workers to hear 
the union’s message.80  If access resulting in a meaningful balance 
were to be achieved, then “success or lack thereof” may or may not 
be relevant at all. 
Lechmere sparked considerable criticism with its suggestion that 
it is reasonable for organizers to communicate with employees by 
standing in traffic with signs while recording license plates.81  On this 
point, Lechmere signaled an end to any theoretical accommodation of 
rights and to any effective communication of section 7 information 
resulting from the unreasonably narrowed Babcock exception.  While 
Lechmere may have signaled an end to nonemployee access to 
employer property, new methods of communication can insert 
reasonableness into representation elections through the neutral 
mediums of private e-mail and the Internet. 
B. Reform Proposal: New Balancers 
There are numerous ways for technology and new forms of 
communication to transform representation elections.  This Note will 
limit discussion to readily achievable methods.82  E-mail and the 
Internet are fast becoming the preferred methods of communication 
and sources of information for millions of Americans.  Including 
employee private e-mail addresses as part of the Excelsior doctrine or 
 
 79. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 540–41. 
 80. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112. 
 81. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 543 (White, J., dissenting) (stating it is “unpersuasive to suggest 
that the union has sufficient access . . . by being able to hold up signs from a public grassy strip 
adjacent to the highway leading to the parking lot”); Bierman, Reply, supra note 9, at 524–25; 
Estlund, supra note 3 at 326–33; Story, supra note 52, at 387–88. 
 82. The reader should keep in mind that there are incalculable permutations to be had with 
technological reforms. 
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requiring employers to post notice of organizing on web sites are 
easily attainable methods of representation election reform.  Both 
would dramatically enhance the ability of workers to receive section 7 
information about workplace representation. 
The latest Census Bureau estimates show that as of August 2000, 
fifty-four million American households, comprising roughly fifty-one 
percent of the population, had one or more computers in the home.83  
This figure is up from 42 percent in 1998, reflecting an almost 10 
percent increase in two years’ time.84  It is also estimated that more 
than two in five households had Internet access in the year 2000, 
which represents approximately 44 percent of American households.85  
Because of the increased availability of computers, Internet usage 
rates are becoming almost synonymous with computer ownership.  
This is reflected by the fact that in 2000, more than four of five 
households with a computer claimed Internet usage.86 
Parties concerned with methods of communication, particularly 
unions relegated to unreasonable methods of communication, will or 
have already taken notice of these facts.87  In his Lechmere dissent, 
Justice White stated that “mere notice that an organizing campaign 
exists” is not enough to ensure that workers are aware of their section 
7 rights and that “actual communication with nonemployee union 
organizers” is necessary “to vindicate section 7 rights.”88  Private e-
mail and the Internet can facilitate actual dialogue and give employ-
ees more than “mere notice” of a campaign’s existence.  Congress, the 
Board, and reviewing courts should embrace the opportunity to use 
these new methods of communication in representation elections 
through reforms in legislation, administrative rulemaking, and 
adjudication. 
 
 83. U.S. CENSUS STATISTICS Aug. 2000, Home Computers and Internet Usage in the 
United States 1–2 fig. 1 (Issued September 2001), available at http://www.census.gov [hereinafter 
CENSUS REPORT].  Other sources report even higher rates.  For example, one states a rate of 
sixty-three percent.  Julia Angwin, E-Business: Has Growth of the Net Flattened?, WALL ST. J., 
July 16, 2001, at B1. 
 84. CENSUS REPORT, supra note 83, at 1–2. 
 85. Id.  In 1997, less than one-half of the households with computers had Internet 
connections.  Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. E.g., ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK, CYBERUNION: EMPOWERING LABOR THROUGH 
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY  (Daniel J.B. Mitchell ed., 1999) (offering suggestions for  the use of 
the computer and the Internet by organized labor). 
 88. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 543 (1992). 
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1. Private E-mail Accounts 
In addition to the information currently supplied in an Excelsior 
list, private e-mail addresses should be included.89  Extending Excel-
sior to include private e-mail addresses would likely result in a higher 
proportion of employees receiving more timely notice of their section 
7 rights.  E-mail is an efficient and portable means of communication. 
Therefore, including e-mail addresses in Excelsior information offers 
unions a faster method of communication than traditional mail 
provides.  In addition to the speed with which employees could 
receive section 7 information, e-mail addresses are not stationary and 
could provide an additional method of contact–one that does not 
usually change when a person moves to a new residence.  This would 
increase the likelihood that more employees receive section 7 infor-
mation because notwithstanding outdated address information, a 
union may be able to reach an employee through an e-mail address. 
Conceivably, the use of private e-mail could also allow employers 
to maintain sovereignty over access to the electronic property of the 
corporate e-mail system by lessening the use of corporate e-mail for 
organizing.90  If a union has the private e-mail addresses of employees 
there will be no need to “hack into” a corporate e-mail system to 
obtain corporate e-mail addresses for use in organizing.91  Moreover,  
employees are often compelled to use an employer’s e-mail system 
while working,92 but there is not usually a compelling reason for 
employees to check private e-mail while on the clock.  Employers 
may assert that the use of private e-mail to conduct organizing will in 
fact occur during work time, yet this is an issue internal to the em-
ployer.  In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Board affirmed a 
ruling against an employer who allowed employees to use its e-mail 
system to distribute information for non work related topics but had a 
ban on using e-mail to distribute union literature.93  If an employer 
wants to institute a broad “no private e-mail policy” then, based on 
 
 89. Telephone numbers are not currently included.  Keeping with this Note’s proposal, 
their inclusion should become mandatory. 
 90.  Use of corporate email systems for organizing labor is a growing concern among 
employers.  Malin and Perritt discuss the ease with which unions can gain access to corporate e-
mail systems.  See Malin & Perritt, supra note 10, at 39–40. 
 91.  See id.; Stanton, supra note 11 (discussing employers’ concerns about unions obtaining 
corporate e-mail addresses). 
 92. Angwin, supra note 83 (stating that forty-two million workers have internet access at 
work, which represents “a twenty-three percent jump in one year”). 
 93. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993). 
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the reasoning of E.I. du Pont de Nemours, it is required not to dis-
criminatorily enforce such a policy.94 
a) Implementation 
If an employer has an e-mail system, a union could be allowed a 
one-time use of that system to advise employees that representation is 
a right they are afforded under the NLRA.  The message could 
instruct employees to reply to the union with their private e-mail 
accounts.  In the alternative, existing rules already obligate employers 
to facilitate the collection of addresses and names of all members of 
the bargaining unit.95  Adding e-mail addresses to the information 
supplied in the list would not pose an undue hardship on the em-
ployer.  The same resources currently used to maintain payroll 
information could easily accommodate the change because employees 
could be asked at the time of hire to provide a private e-mail account 
as a part of their contact information. 
b) Avoiding Delay 
An important benefit of using private email addresses is that the 
union messages are not unnecessarily delayed.  Employees would not 
have to wait for traditional mailings to be sent through the postal 
service before obtaining the information necessary to cultivate an 
informed choice for workplace representation.  Additionally, the 
current method for checking the accuracy of a list causes more 
delay.96 
Unions are only guaranteed Excelsior information during the 
time leading up to an election.  In contrast, the employer is able to 
campaign during work time and, by virtue of having the information, 
can send antiunion letters to employees at home.97  Kate Bronfen-
brenner concluded in her study of the effects of employer behavior in 
elections that “for every additional letter that the company mails out, 
 
 94. Id.; see also Stanton, supra note 11 at 663–64. 
 95. Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239–40. 
  96. Schlossberg and Scott suggest that organizers immediately check the accuracy of an 
Excelsior list upon receipt.  They further suggest that the list be checked by mailing correspon-
dence to the address given by the employer and waiting for returned mail to indicate which 
contact information was incorrect.  SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT, supra note 49, at 210. 
 97. The Board justified its holding in Excelsior based, in part, on the fact that employers 
already have employee home addresses for mailings and are able to communicate with 
employees at work.  156 N.L.R.B. at 1240. 
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the percentage of votes cast for the union declines by 2.5%.”98  Thus, 
the practice of requiring unions to inform employees about their right 
to representation in a limited amount of time does great injury to the 
“laboratory conditions”99 of the election campaign.  Adding more 
delay through the postal system adds insult to that injury. 
Unions must check Excelsior information through trial and er-
ror,100 which is an exercise in the inefficient.  If addresses supplied in 
the list are incorrect, the union must wait at least several days, and 
possibly more than a week, for organizational materials to come back 
indicating that an incorrect name or address was supplied.101  Even 
with the prevalent use of mail forwarding, if an employee no longer 
resides at the address provided, the union’s organizational materials 
are unnecessarily delayed as they are forwarded.  This is simply 
inefficient in terms of time, energy, and mailing costs.  Providing 
organizers with private e-mail addresses would enable the union to 
verify the accuracy of an address with the employee before mailing 
and allow more employees to receive notice of their section 7 right to 
representation. 
c) Other Efficiency Concerns 
If it is determined that e-mail communication is preferable to 
written communication in a given campaign, one electronic message 
could be sent to the bargaining unit and the e-mail addresses would 
be checked in a matter of minutes by a reply message indicating 
which, if any, addresses are incorrect.  The organizer would then have 
the option to request that the employer supplement the e-mail 
address list with correct information or to ask the entire unit, via e-
mail, as to whether a correct address is known.102 
Perhaps a correct e-mail address, phone number, or traditional 
address could be provided for every member of the unit.  Giving 
employees the option to add a personal e-mail address to the infor-
 
 98. Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-
Contract Campaigns, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 82 (Sheldon 
Friedman et al. eds., 1994). 
 99. A discussion of the “laboratory conditions” doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note.  
It refers to the pre-election rules that do not rest on unfair labor practice prohibitions.  For an 
overview of the doctrine see THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 5, at 337–75. 
 100. SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT, supra note 49, at 210. 
 101. Many times employers will not know that information is incorrect, yet some employers 
deliberately provide false information.  Id. at 212. 
 102. See Technology Services Solutions, infra notes 125–36 and accompanying text.  This is 
exactly the inquiry the ALJ suggested be done over the employer’s e-mail system. 
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mation supplied in an Excelsior list would radically alter their ability 
to gain information about union representation.  Other than the 
dramatic difference it would make to employees due to more timely 
receipt of section 7 information, it would have little or no effect on 
the existing rules of nonemployee access to employer property 
because organizers would not have to enter an employer’s property.103 
2. Internet Web Sites 
The second readily available reform proposal is the use of Inter-
net web sites at the inception of a campaign.  The use of Internet web 
sites in organizing campaigns is not a new idea; most international 
unions and many locals have web sites.104  A union, with detailed 
information specific to an employer, could create a web site, or a link, 
for a particular group of employees to inform them of their section 7 
right to representation.105  Problematic, however, is that no web site 
can communicate section 7 information unless employees are given 
notice of the web site’s existence.  Employers should be required to 
post conspicuous notices advising employees of a web site’s existence. 
Further, if an employer has an e-mail system, it should allow a union 
to send out a one-time notice through its corporate system advising 
employees of the web site’s existence.106  An employer would still be 
free to clarify its corporate Internet policy and, if appropriate, instruct 
employees to only visit organizing sites during nonwork time, pref-
erably at home.  Additionally, employers could block access from 
company computers to the organizing site by using the company’s 
 
 103. See supra notes 22–33 and accompanying text. 
 104. The AFL-CIO web site contains links to the sites of its affiliates. See 
http://www.aflcio.org.  The Communications Workers of America, and the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers have great organizing materials and links to the sites of 
many of their locals.  See http://www.cwa-union.org; http://www.ibew.org.  The United Mine 
Workers of America web site offers a map of the United States the user can click on to receive 
organizational materials from the appropriate affiliate.  See http://www.umwa.org. 
 105. SHOSTAK, supra note 87, at 43, 46–47 (offering similar suggestions in hypothetical 
examples). 
 106. Peter DeChiara suggests that NLRA rights should be posted through government 
mandated posters as is done for other workplace laws such as wage and hour protections, 
workplace safety, and antidiscrimination laws.  Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An 
Argument for Informing Employees of Their Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 432 (1995).  Alan Zmija proposes that the government publish and 
distribute informational pamphlets advising workers of their NLRA rights as a counterbalance 
to the rules of access.  Alan L. Zmija, Union Organizing After Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.—A 
Time to Reexamine the Rule of Babcock & Wilcox, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. & Emp. L.J. 65, 132 
(1994).  The reform suggested in the Note could achieve some of the benefits of both proposals 
through an electronic notice procedure. 
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firewall.  By simply giving notice of a web site, many of the rules 
constituting the current access doctrine could be rendered unneces-
sary because the union could conduct a substantial amount of its 
section 7 protected communication without having to set foot on the 
employer’s property. 
A variation of this proposal may already be occurring in the re-
tail industry where organizers “blitz” an establishment with printed 
cards directing employees to a web site the employee might find of 
interest.107  Posting notice of an organizing web site could promote on-
line discussion and debate,108 while simultaneously eliminating the 
need for section 7 rights to be covertly communicated to workers 
through the “blitz” approach.  By adopting a web site notice proce-
dure, employees would benefit from a discussion about the section 7 
right to representation and employers could avoid having nonem-
ployee organizers on their property.109 
C. Eliminating the Geographic Limits of Excelsior 
Excelsior recognized that it is difficult, if not impossible, to ob-
tain contact information for all members of a bargaining unit because 
“in the absence of employer disclosure, a list of names and addresses 
is extremely difficult if not impossible to obtain.”110  Yet mere posses-
sion of Excelsior information is often not enough to result in an 
informed electorate.  A name and address will not help a great deal in 
situations where employees do not live close together, such as in 
suburban settings.  The dissemination of section 7 information is also 
frustrated when the Board makes a bargaining unit determination 
beyond that for which contact information was supplied in an Excel-
sior list.111 
 
 107. SHOSTAK, supra note 87, at 47. 
 108. Professor Bierman suggests incorporating workplace debates as part of an extensive 
overhaul of the representation election.  See Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 33–34; Gely 
& Bierman, supra note 3, at 183.  While in-person debates would likely be more informative and 
accurate, there is no indication that they would be readily adopted as a reform.  Facilitating a 
web site notice proposal could achieve some of the benefits of a debate reform as it can easily 
evolve into a less intrusive “cyber-debate.” 
 109. In addition to retail workers, hospital workers are also under constraining access rules.  
The proposed reform would prove useful in informing them of their section 7 right to represen-
tation.  Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978). 
 110. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1241 (1966). 
 111. Either party to an election can petition to obtain clarification of a bargaining unit.  THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 5, at 411–12.  The power to determine the “appropriate” 
unit ultimately rests with the Board.  29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2002). 
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Critics of the home visits doctrine argue that, as a balance, Excel-
sior has increasingly become ineffective because workers are becom-
ing more decentralized.112  “[T]he home visits doctrine appears to be 
based on a model of economic life that suggests that employees live in 
close proximity to the workplace.”113  Even the Babcock Court gave 
considerable weight to the fact that the employees lived in small 
towns within a hundred miles of the work site.114  No longer can there 
be the presumption that a workforce operates from a central location, 
lives in a nearby small town, or even reports to work at all because 
many workers can now work from home.115  Yet the doctrines of 
access and Excelsior continue to operate under such paradigms.  The 
introduction of private e-mail and Internet web sites into representa-
tion elections would lessen the gap in access created by a suburban-
ized, decentralized workforce. 
Another impasse in communication occurs when bargaining units 
are large or when they are expanded beyond the scope that a union 
canvassed with section 7 information.  This can present a huge 
obstacle to organizers who must reach large numbers of employees in 
a short time.  The Act states that the extent of union organizing shall 
not be determinative of whether a unit is appropriate.116  Although 
the power ultimately rests with the Board, some employers use the 
unit clarification petition as a defeat tactic with the understanding 
that it is harder to organize a larger or modified unit.117  Examining 
this trend, Bronfenbrenner concludes that when other variables are 
controlled, “the probability of the union winning an election declines 
by as much as 15% when the unit is changed after the petition is 
filed.”118  Adopting the reform suggested in this Note would facilitate 
better communication with larger units and render a petition to 
increase unit size a useless employer tactic.  Unions would have better 
opportunities to communicate section 7 rights to all employees 
determined to be in a larger or expanded bargaining unit. 
 
 112. Gely & Bierman, supra note 3, at 155–57. 
 113. Id. at 156 (citing Babcock and stating that the Lechmere court “flatly refused to 
consider the present day context in which the access question arose”). 
 114. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 106–07 (1956). 
 115. Broder, supra note 10, at 1639–42 (stating that “going to work” may be an “early 
casualty of the Digital Revolution”). 
 116. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c)(5). 
 117. SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT, supra note 49, at 217. 
 118. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 98, at 78–80. 
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D. Additional Improvements to Excelsior and Access 
1. Privacy 
The home visits doctrine requires employees to sacrifice some 
level of privacy and autonomy in favor of their employer’s property 
rights.119  Providing unions with private e-mail addresses or giving 
notice of a web site would enable an employee to determine the 
forum of campaign contact, be it face-to-face, on the telephone, or in 
electronic format.  If an employee indicates that electronic contact is 
preferred, then a home visit or a telephone call could be avoided.  
Employees could be assured of receiving section 7 information 
without having to sacrifice their home privacy in favor of their 
employers’ property interests. 
2. Employee Self-Determination 
In addition to protecting employee privacy in the home through 
a decreased emphasis on home visits and telephone calls, this pro-
posed reform also allows an employee to regulate the actual amount 
of electronic communication received.  The employee who disfavors 
representation will not likely respond to the one-time use option.  
Furthermore, when contacted through private e-mail supplied in an 
employer provided list, the employee who disfavors representation 
may advise the sender of his or her adverse position and thwart future 
contact by “blocking” messages from the account.120  Both the use of 
private e-mail and an informational web site would improve the 
position of the employee in organizing efforts because an undecided 
employee, and one who favors a union’s message, will have more 
timely information for their decision.  In contrast, an employee who 
resents the presence of organizers will be better able to control the 
flow of information. 
3. The Image of a Competent Representative 
Section 7 gives employees a right to the representation of their 
choice. Those unaware of this right become knowledgeable through a 
 
 119. This is Professor Bierman’s principal argument against continuation of the home visits 
doctrine because he perceives it to be an invasion of the home.  Bierman, Home Visits, supra 
note 9; Bierman, Reply, supra note 9; Gely & Bierman, supra note 3.  The proposal in this Note 
would serve to ease some of Bierman’s concerns about protecting home privacy. 
 120. Most e-mail systems can be set to block messages from a sender. 
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union seeking to be their representative.  A positive image is not 
conveyed if an entity seeking to act as a representative must stand in 
traffic and wave a sign to communicate with certain employees.  
Aside from the actual loss of section 7 information during its trans-
mission in this manner, the psychological impact of such a transaction 
undoubtedly taints what information is absorbed.  Technological 
reforms could reinforce the union’s position of competently repre-
senting the employee’s interest. 
The current practice of excluding nonemployee union organizers 
from employer property places additional value on the employer’s 
message because the right to exclude organizers is equal to an at-
work silencing of the union’s message.121  The value of giving informa-
tion to the employee about section 7 rights is, by implication, viewed 
as subordinate to the right of the employer to exclude the organizer.122  
This image is not consistent with accommodating the interests of all 
parties as set forth in Babcock.123 
If, through reforms similar to those proposed in this Note, organ-
izers are able to present a strong image, as one on par with the 
employer, then employee section 7 rights will more likely come to 
fruition.  The employer could remain sovereign over its property 
while not lessening the image of the union as a competent representa-
tive.  The union could have some level of balance in access, and 
employees would receive timely information about their choice for 
workplace representation. 
4. Correcting the “Too Little, Too Late” Problem 
The web site notice proposal or the use of private e-mail ad-
dresses can both be utilized to correct the “too little, too late” prob-
lem which, according to Professor Bierman, is inherent in the 
Excelsior doctrine.124  Congress or the Board could require an em-
ployer to post the notice of an organizing web site, or send out a one-
time e-mail, when a bona fide union expresses interest in organizing a 
workforce.  As such, the “balance” of the Excelsior doctrine could be 
achieved through extension into the prepetition stages of an election.  
 
 121. White, supra note 9, at 150 (“[o]n a subjective level, the fact that a union is forced to 
campaign outside company property may have an important effect on election outcomes, 
because it influences how the union is perceived by the targeted employees”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). 
 124. Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 9–10; Gely & Bierman, supra note 3, at 180; 
White, supra note 9. 
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This extension could achieve balance without major disruption to the 
existing doctrine of property access because employees could receive 
notice of their section 7 rights without the need for nonemployee 
union organizers to enter the property of employers. 
III. CASE EXAMPLE: TECHNOLOGY SERVICES SOLUTIONS125 
Technology Services Solutions (“Technology Services”) is a series 
of administrative rulings and Board decisions involving the same 
employer and Local 111 of the International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers.126  This set of rulings illustrates the need for technologi-
cal reform in representation elections and, as such, requires closer 
examination into the context of extending the Excelsior doctrine to 
include private e-mail addresses.127  The situation that gave rise to 
Technology Services was a function of a decentralized work force and 
the resulting geographic obstacles to organizing, combined with the 
problem of an expanded bargaining unit.128 
A. Background 
Originally, two Colorado-based bargaining units of sixty-three 
computer service technicians participated in a representation elec-
tion.129  The employer requested a modification to the bargaining unit 
and the Board found that the appropriate unit130 consisted of one 
 
 125. Malin, Perritt, and Wilcox examine this case to prove the point that the Board has just 
begun the long task of incorporating technology into the representation election.  Malin  &  
Perritt, supra note 10, at 22–24, 33, 37, 50–52; Wilcox, supra note 10, at 266 (suggesting private 
e-mail will be an issue, yet not examining it as a reform proposal). 
 126. Technology Services has been before the Board three times and been twice remanded 
to the ALJ for reconsideration.  The initial Board decision, at 324 N.L.R.B. 298, was remanded 
to an ALJ and critiqued by commentators.  See Malin & Perritt, supra note 10, at 50–52.  Since 
that commentary, the case was remanded to the ALJ and the Board partially affirmed that 
ruling.  332 N.L.R.B., No. 100, slip op. at 1 (Oct. 31, 2000).  Most recently, the union filed a 
motion to modify the notice procedure resulting from the partial victory won in the second 
Board decision.  334 N.L.R.B., No. 18, slip op. at 1 (May 24, 2001). 
 127. As previously discussed, there are many ways for technology to reform representation 
elections.  While private e-mail addresses represents one solution, other technology proposals 
could possibly work just as effectively. 
 128. 332 N.L.R.B. 1., No. 100, slip op. at 2. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Section 159(b) states that  “to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the 
rights guaranteed by [the Act],” the Board is to determine in each case what is an appropriate 
unit.  29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2000).  The proviso of section 159(b) prohibits the inclusion of 
professional employees within a unit of nonprofessional employees, the disruption of a prior 
Board determination of appropriateness, and the inclusion of guards within a unit of employees 
not obligated to protect an employer’s property.  Id.  Other than these guidelines, the Board is 
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covering all of the employer’s 236 employees in its south-central 
region, which covered the expanse of eight states.131  The union and 
the General Counsel invoked, by analogy, the inaccessibility excep-
tion to the general access rule of Lechmere and requested an Excel-
sior type list of the names and addresses of the new members of the 
expanded unit.132  The Board denied the request stating that the 
General Counsel “fell short of proving his contention that the Union 
had no reasonable means of communicating with the bargaining unit 
employees unless [provided with the list].”133 
The Board affirmed the ruling of the Administrative Law Judge 
(“ALJ”) who made suggestions in his decision as to how the union 
organizer could have communicated with the expanded unit. In doing 
so, he reasoned that if the organizer had employed his suggested 
methods, there would have been no need to invoke the exception to 
Lechmere.134  The ALJ stated that the organizer should have asked 
more of the original unit members, such as whether they had the 
names or contact information for employees elsewhere in the re-
gion.135  He also suggested that the organizer should have made more 
extensive use of a particular prounion employee to solicit over an 
employer’s e-mail system.136  His final suggestion was that the organ-
izer should have made contacts through the prounion employees who 
had some face-to-face contact during training sessions or at times 
when they visited centralized service facilities.137 
B. A Technological Solution to Technology Services 
Manifest in Technology Services was the great lengths to which 
the Board was willing to go in avoiding an extension of Excelsior into 
the prepetition stage of the campaign.138  Professors Martin Malin and 
Henry Perritt surmised of the first Technology Services decision that, 
 
given wide discretion to make the determination of an appropriate unit on a case by case basis.  
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 5, at 448–50. 
 131. Tech. Servs., 332 N.L.R.B., No. 100, slip op. at 2.  The unit determination was made in 
an unpublished opinion.  The unit was expanded to include Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and parts of Nebraska and Wyoming. 
 132. Id. at 2. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 22–28. 
 135. Id. at 4. 
 136. Id. at 14. 
 137. Id. at 15–17, 24–27. 
 138. The impending need to address e-mail, the Internet, and decentralized workforce 
organizing was also avoided. 
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in the absence of Excelsior information for the entire unit, the alter-
natives left to the union by the ALJ’s decision would have solicitation 
occurring either via the employer’s computer system or during work 
time.139  This critique signals caution because an employer faced with 
organizing methods such as these will likely raise a challenge to 
prevent unions from traipsing over its ostensible property rights in its 
computer systems and seek to prevent the solicitation of workers 
during work time.140 
Implementation of a reform such as the one proposed in this 
Note would remedy some of the inconsistency in the Technology 
Services situation.  Providing the organizer with the private e-mail 
address of the original unit of employees would have enabled the 
organizer to communicate effectively with a decentralized workforce 
and the expanded unit, while allowing the existing constraining 
property rights regime to remain unchanged.141  By utilizing private e-
mail addresses or having the employer give notice of a web site to its 
entire workforce, an organizer could likely communicate with an 
expanded unit without employing methods involving an employer’s e-
mail system or forcing work time solicitation. 
C. The Other Reasonable Means Exception 
Not only does Technology Services provide a case for adding pri-
vate e-mail addresses to the Excelsior doctrine and using web site 
notices, it also offers an opportunity to examine the limits of techno-
logical reform.  Not every worker will have access to the Internet and 
using new methods of communication could run the risk of further 
limiting the “other reasonable means to communication” exception to 
the Babcock-Lechmere doctrine.142  The Board and courts may 
surmise that, because unions have an electronic method of communi-
cating with employees, preserving traditional methods is no longer 
necessary. 
 
 139. Malin & Perritt, supra note 10, at 52.  Their article provides an extensive examination 
of the ALJ’s rulings and the Board’s review of them.  Such detail is not warranted in this Note.  
Subsequent rulings remain consistent on the points critiqued, in that they leave much room for 
controversy. 
 140. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 5, at 87–94, 98–104, for a discussion of 
these blackletter doctrines regarding access and solicitation. 
 141. The employees of Technology Services Solutions were computer service representa-
tives and many were former employees of IBM; it is highly probable that many if not most of 
these employees had a private e-mail account, or could have easily created one.  Tech. Servs., 
332 N.L.R.B., No. 100, slip op. at 2. 
 142. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text. 
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Even with the potential introduction of technology into the rep-
resentation election, there should be no further limit placed on 
nonemployee access or the exception.  As widely popular as e-mail 
and the Internet are, it would be foolish to assume that all workers 
will have access to,143 or will use, these mediums.144  Unions may stand 
to gain some degree of access to a certain percentage of workers 
through the use of private e-mail and web site notice. However, just 
because unions would stand to gain a new method of contact they 
should not be prevented from using traditional methods.  For exam-
ple, e-mail, like a phone call, must be received to be effective and, 
thus, its availability should not supplant doctrines that uphold face-to-
face contact. 145 
As for the exception doctrine, Lechmere itself leaves little room 
for the Babcock exception to survive and, after Technology Services, 
it is now hard to imagine further limitations on organizing than those 
suggested in that decision.  Thus, as a practical matter, even further 
limiting the Babcock-Lechmere exception may not result in any more 
harm to employee section 7 rights.  Using private e-mail addresses 
and Internet web sites would practically help workers receive more 
section 7 information while running the risk of further narrowing an 
unhelpful exception. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This reform proposal does not solve the problem of the whole, 
but lessens the harm to the parts, in that more information is dissemi-
nated while giving extreme deference to an employer’s interest in 
property.  Forcing unions to work with limited methods of communi-
 
 143. See CENSUS REPORT, supra note 83.  The Census statistics cite considerable differences 
in Internet access and computer ownership for different races.  For example, Caucasians and 
Asian and Pacific Islanders reported 57.7% and 66% usage rates, respectively; however, 
African-Americans only reported 37% and Hispanics reported 35.3%.  Id. at 7 tbl. C “Access to 
a Home Computer and use of the Internet at Home by Adults 18 Years and Over: August 
2000.” 
 144. Not all Americans readily adopt new technology.  It took more than thirty years for 
televisions to reach the current 98% penetration rate among U.S. households and telephones 
lingered at 35% from 1920 to 1950 until finally reaching 90% in the 1970s.  However, the 
Internet, now around 57%, has grown faster than many technologies.  See Angwin, supra note 
83. 
 145. Miles Macik argues that e-mail should not be characterized as solicitation or distribu-
tion and should be completely taken out of the Lechmere/Babcock context.  Miles Macik, 
“You’ve Got Mail.”  A Look at the Application of the Solicitation and Distribution Rules of the 
National Labor Relations Board to the Use of E-mail in Union Organizing Drives, 78 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 591, 613–15 (2001). 
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cation serves no party’s interest, except that of an employer hostile to 
union organizing.  The addition of private e-mail addresses and web 
site notice postings into the current regime would reflect the needs of 
contemporary society and do little injury to existing doctrine, save a 
more informed electorate. 
At its inception, the Board stated that it would defer reconsid-
eration of the rules of access to employees with section 7 information 
until the “effects of Excelsior become known.”146  After standing 
unchanged for more than three decades—the effects are known.  
Excelsior fails to provide section 7 information to employees or 
balance nonemployee access.147  For the sake of American workers, it 
is time for reform.  A situation such as Technology Services will 
undoubtedly arise again and the Board must not stand down from the 
opportunity to embrace new modes of communication as a way to 
more fully effectuate the right of employees to receive information 
about their right to workplace representation. 
It has been said that  “[t]he reasonable [person] adapts to the 
world: the unreasonable [person] persists in trying to adapt the world 
to [him or herself].  Therefore all progress depends on the unreason-
able [person].”148  If it is reasonable for union organizers to effectuate 
the section 7 rights of workers by adapting to the suggestion that they 
advise workers of the right to representation while standing on 
narrow strips of grass found between lanes of rushing traffic—then no 
progress is to be made in this area.  Yet, if Congress, the Board, and 
reviewing courts succumb to the voice of the “unreasonable” person 
who insists that the same information can be communicated in a more 
respectable manner—then representation elections will progress into 
the twenty-first Century with dignity. 
 
 146. General Electric Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247, 1251 (1966). 
 147. E.g., Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9; Gely & Bierman, supra note 3; White, supra 
note 9. 
 148. George Bernard Shaw, Maxims for Revolutionists, in MAN AND SUPERMAN 729, 739 
(Dodd, Mead & Company 1962) (1903).  In keeping with progress, an alteration of this quote 
required the use of inclusive language. 
